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'l'HE INI'ERAC'TION OF PUI3LIC LffiAL ORDERS: IMPACI'S UPON EAQI Ol'HER AND UPON 
THE EMERGING PUBLIC ORDER OF SPACE 
Harry H. Alm:md 
The National War College 
Washington, D.C. 20319 
Abstract 
The interaction of the public legal orders of 
states upon each other, and upon the emerging 
public legal order in outer space, and in general, 
has long been recognized "by civilized nations." 
The perspectives of this civilizing process as the 
perspective of law are critical, because law has 
always been identified as the assurance of protec-
tions it affords to peoples--or to states. This 
is the correct meaning of "equality before the 
law." It is also the reason why the concern with 
human rights goes to the essence of the legitimacy 
of any legal order. Moreover, the peoples of 
states, as the_United Nations Charter declares at 
the outset, are the true repositories of "sovereign-
ty" among, within and between states. 
In a true spirit of d~tente, disagreements 
among jurists like those that arise from the states 
from which they come, are relieved and moderated 
by open debate, by recourse to scientific and 
objective perspectives, by reasoned argument, and 
by the continuing and candid exchange of views. 
Jurists for this reason, as professional members 
of an internationally-oriented endeavor, extend 
their own efforts and analysis far beyond govern-
ments, primarily because they are not constrained 
in their communications with each other. It is 
under these conditions that the present inquiry 
examines the general principles of law, and seeks 
their constructive application in order to make 
public order-projecting recommendations for 
decision-makers. 
The policy content is a critical indicia of 
law-projecting decisions, and shares with the 
authoritative element of such decisions and their 
controlling force, the three factors that 
characterize the law-oriented policy processes. 
Against these elements of policy, authority and 
control, this inquiry examines and compares the 
views of two distinguished jurists: Professor 
Grigori Tunkin of the Soviet Union and Professor 
Myres S. McDougal of the United States. This 
inquiry is preliminary in nature intended to con-
sider the differences in perspectives of these 
jurists, and also intended to consider the policy 
implications arising from those differences. 
Accordingly, the primary focus is upon 
clarification of policies relating to the global 
social processes. It is assumed that most 
jurists will agree that the law itself and the 
legal instruments of law are, like all strategies, 
aimed at strategic goals, and applied as strategic 
instruments of policy, among the major power 
blocs, and by smaller states and regional group-
ings of states as well. Because in their 
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relations generally, these strategies determine 
in large measure the shaping of law, jurists are 
compelled to face strong tendencies, which, if un-
checked under law, will degenerate into instruments 
of naked power. Such instruments can undermine the 
existing law, and deny the flourishing of law it-
self. Jurists engaged in justifying the use of 
naked power as advocates of the policies of states 
to control, without invoking valid and validated 
claims to authority, become part of a state's 
strategic policy apparatus. 
Jurists, thenJface the possibilities in the 
growing tolerances for naked power and its exer-
cise that their common quest for serving global 
order, for accommodating and adjusting the 
differences of opposing social orders, and for 
helping to shape strategies and the global social 
order itself toward peace and security, will falter 
or fail. Such jurists will be diverted from an 
effective pursuit for the optimization of the value 
demands of peoples, projected in the civilizing and 
law-oriented claims for human dignity, and the 
quest to uncover and overcome the obstacles in 
achieving these goals. Like the Melians arguing 
before the Athenians in Thucydides'Peloponnesian 
War they will be tempted to acquiesce to naked 
power alone. 
I 
Public legal orders among states and within 
states must address at the outset the most critical 
concerns that all states share in all of their 
relations with each other. This is the concern 
with operational security--both internal and 
external security. This is a concern with the 
fundamental policy that is present both in the 
regimes expected to regulate territorial air space 
and the policy to be shared among states in regu-
lating activities in outer space. The policies of 
states associated with this concern determine the 
relevant principles of law that can be drawn from 
the public legal orders of states and applied in 
their shared public legal order, whether that is 
the general legal order--and international law, or 
the law relating to outer space. 
In this inquiry the primary focus is upon the 
legal regulation of force and, because much has 
been developed regarding this complex subject, two 
leading jurists have been selected for views, 
believed to be representative of significant 
perspectives relating to the regulation of relations 
among states. Professor Grigori Tunkin, primarily 
in his THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,l and Professor 
Myres S. McDougal, distinguished jurist in the 
United States afford an opportunity to compare the 
differing perspectives of two major jurists, and 
from the comparison to draw out possible alterna-
tives in which jurists in general might better 
serve the global community in establishing public 
order and security. Because in these endeavors the 
focus is upon the relations of states in 811 the 
arenas in which they are competing with each other, 
these relations, in a competitive power process, 
become the primary focus of inquiry. No jurist can 
absent himself from this process and also aim at 
workable recommendations for a single state or for 
the global community at large, nor can he omit the 
overriding thrust of the United Nations Charter 
and its controls. 
The overriding perspective then is that 
which perceives nation-states confronting each 
other, largely through the major power blocs, 
acting to support and benefit from their actions 
in a competitive power process. Such a perspec-
tive perceives a loosely-organized order among 
states. Foremost in the demands among states and 
their peoples is first to build upon the minimum 
order that they can establish, to then seek through 
arms control and other foreign policy initiatives, 
the means to reduce hostility, and pursue the 
measures that strengthen that order and sustain 
it. A more substantial global public order must 
await the practice of states. The policy dimen-
sions of law are clearly established when we seek 
the primary "source" of law among states in their 
practice--i.e., in their behavior patterns, 
evidenced in their relations, and most specifically 
in their actions, and in their decisions and policy, 
their tolerances for behavior, and in the recipro-
cities that are associated with their claims and 
counterclaims relating to what conduct is 
permissible or impermissible. 
Codification and attempts through far-reach-
ing treaty providions are meaningless if they are 
not validated by the practice of states. The 
"general principles of law" drawn from the public 
legal orders become largely abstractions, depending 
for their policy content upon application--and 
therefore upon the practice of states themselves. 
Foremost in the expectations among states under 
these conditions is that they will be able freely 
to act in their own self-defense. 
II 
The perspectives of all states regarding the 
emerging public legal order among states 
necessarily include as the foremost issue that 
which relates to the regulation of the use of force. 
While our perspectives also embrace expectations 
that "peaceful purposes" must be served in outer 
space, that states must engage in "peaceful activi-
ties," and that outer space is the "province of man-
kind," all of these remain at best policy goals or 
principles whose policy content is to be 
established in the future practice among states. 
Most important in our perspectives is that 
which relates to the competitive power process in 
which "sovereign" states find themselves. It is 
possible to consider this process as innate to the 
behavior of states that are drawn toward absolute 
sovereignty, and it is also possible to perceive 
that such expectations lead, necessarily, to 
limiting public order, primarily by limiting the 
application of community policies to the law-making 
activities of states. States engaged in competi-
tive processes aimed at power tend, in the extreme, 
to favor naked power--power free of the conditions 
imposed through law. If these tendencies are not 
moderated, they are fed by actions and policies of 
states aimed at military measures--at making the 
military instrument the primary strategic instru-
ment of policy. 
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The regulatory framework among states relating 
to controls over international coercion--and more 
emphatically over the use of force in their rela-
tions--is to be found in the United Nations 
Charter, and in customary international law, sup-
plemented by the law established among them to 
further the expectations in this body of law 
through international treaties and agreements. 
The effectiveness of that regulatory framework is 
to be found in the application, the shared invoca-
tion, and in the development--through institutions 
procedures, and processes--of the prescriptive law. 
The prescriptive law is to be found in the general 
norms such as Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter, amplified by other articles such as 
Article 2(3), and balanced by the realistic per-
ception that states must seek their own measures 
for self-defense--with or without the aid of 
alliances--pursuant to Article 51. 
Further prescription as such is not needed: 
the Charter and customary international law, 
coupled with ample practice among states, 
reveals that no aggression is to be tolerated, 
that the use of any weapons--not just the nuclear 
and mass destruction weapons--for aggression is 
equally prohibited, that behavior that is 
aggressive, hostile or confrontational whether 
within the social orders among and of states or 
among them is contrary to the expectations of the 
global community. For this reason, attention to 
prescribing new law for nonaggression, for 
restraints on the use of weaponry--first use or 
all uses, and so on, are redundant and draw atten-
tion from far more significant tasks. The 
effectiveness of law among states like that within 
them depends upon an effective framework for pro-
jecting law as policy--and this makes important 
demands upon all of those implementing measures 
that depend upon reliable, effective, comprehensive 
and timely communications that are accurate and 
conducted in good faith. The present relations 
among states suggest that the task of jurists in 
promoting this great law-making effort is 
formidable, and that the obstacles lie in the 
great divergence in value demands--at least those 
promoted and made among the major decision-makers 
of states. 
When states are insecure in their relations, 
it is abundantly evident that their prescriptions--
their prohibitions on the use of force or violence 
or their undertakings to refrain from the use of 
force--must be balanced against what they perceive 
to be intrusions upon their security. For this 
reason, the efforts to "define" aggression have 
failed to enter into practice--and hence into 
effective law. 2 For this reason, also, states have 
pursued their efforts to test and ensure the 
reliability of weaponry produced through modern 
technologies. And, because compliance goes to the 
essense of mutual and shared security, and depends 
upon sound communications among them, it is evident 
that all proposals for outer space to regulate 
weaponry or the use of force in that arena will be 
countered by the overriding claim involved in 
self-defense. 
Furthermore, because self-defense in any con-
text means the use of weapons, ready, available 
and tested as reliable, to counter aggression or 
the use of weapons for aggressive purposes, all 
states will insist that whatever actions are taken 
concerning the control of weapons, they will re-
tain for themselves the weapons needed for self-
defense. This can only mean that their space ob-
jects whether defended from outer space--by them-
selves or through other space objects--or from 
launchings from the land or from the atmosphere--
must be defended by force when necessary. The 
weapons used for this purpose are weapons to be 
directed to the space objects, o~ satellites, of 
aggressor states, and, accordingly, self defense 
means the right to test, determine the reliability 
and ensure the readiness of anti-satellite weapons, 
and, when necessary to use them to counter an 
armed attack. This entire framework is preserved 
in outer space, because the outer space treaties 
have incorporated without affecting this develop-
ment the United Nations Charter. To prohibit such 
weapons for such purposes would be tantamount to 
withholding a claim to self defense, and, more 
particularly, to amending the United Nations 
Charter, or rendering it inapplicable in outer 
space. 
Perceived in this way, the relations of 
states in outer space are an extrapolation without 
substantial change of their terrestrial relations. 
The United Nations Charter and international law 
applicable in general are applicable to those rela-
tions and to their activities in outer space. 
III 
Jurists are concerned with the value demands 
that are established among peoples and states and 
affecting their behavior, as well as with their 
expectations regarding violence, because these are 
interrelated. Western commnetators have symbolized 
the greater reach of western values as the values 
among its peoples and that these are turned toward 
optimizing the public orders that promote human 
dignity. A distinguished panel concerned with 
balancing out the weaponry and the potential for 
nuclear war referred to as the Scowcroft Commission 
(i.e., named for the Chairman, Brent Scowcroft), 
identifies the concerns of the Western nations with 
the impacts of those social orders that would im-
pair or jeopardize these values: 
The members of the Commission 
fully understand not only the 
purposes for which this nation 
(the United States) maintains 
its deterrent, but also the 
devastating mnature of nuclear 
warfare, should deterrence fail. 
The Commission believes that 
effective arms control is an 
essential element in diminishing 
the risk of nuclear war--while 
preserving our liberties and 
those of like-minded nations. 
At the same time the Commission 
is persuaded that as we consider 
the threat of mass destruction we 
must consider simultaneously the 
threat of aggressive totalitarianism--
our task as a nation cannot be 
understood from a position of moral 
neutrality toward the differences 
between liberty and totalitarianism. 
These differences proceed from con-
flicting views regarding the rights 
of individuals and the nature of 
society.3 
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The two distinct, yet interacting, objectives 
of the United Nations Charter echo the concerns 
set forth in the excerpt just cited from the 
Scowcroft report. The Charter--in the preambles 
and in its purposes, and in such operative provi-
sions as Articles 55 and 56--makes clear that the 
United Nations would be meaningless if states were 
not dedicated both to optimizing the claims for 
human rights of their citizens, and to maintaining 
for them, internally, and externally international 
peace and security. 
The practice of states amply reveals that 
simply prescribing "guarantees" of human rights 
is also meaningless, unless the individual is 
given effective processes and procedures for 
remedy and correction against the abuses of 
officials. The far-reaching principles embraced 
in "due process of law" commencing in England 
before articulation in the Magna Carta, but 
clearly signalled in ancient Greece have now been 
promoted in the important basket of the Helsinki 
Accords. 4 These differences identified in the 
Scowcroft report are differences that are funda-
mental in the perspectives of the totalitarian 
states and the Western democracies. 
Moreover, the Scowcroft Report points out 
that the threat is not simply the threat of nuclear 
weapons nor of modern weapons technology. The 
threat that all states face comes from the unleashed 
violence of warfare and aggression. Nuclear weap-
ons exist, hence there is the danger they might be 
used. But conventional warfare, destructive in 
its own right, can lead to nuclear warfare: 
There can be no doubt that the very 
scope of the possible tragedy of 
modern nuclear war, and the in-
creased destruction made possible 
even by modern nonnuclear technology, 
have changed the nature of war it-
self. This is not only because 
massive conventional war with modern 
weapons could be horrendously 
destructive--some fifth million 
people died in 'conventional' 
World War II before the advent of 
nuclear weapons--but also because 
conventional war between the world's 
major power blocs is the most likely 
way for nuclear war to develop. The 
problem of deterring the threat of 
nuclear war, in short, cannot be 
isolated from the overall power 
balance between East and West. 
Simply put, it is war that must 
concern us, not nuclear war alone. 5 
These are perspectives, then, that embrace 
the insistence that the value demands that have 
so long been shaped in Western democracies, that 
at a minimum such demands are those relating to 
optimizing a public order of human dignity within 
and among states, that arms control must during the 
process of optimization of such a public order 
ensure that no war between the "world's major 
power blocs" breaks out, and that, to ensure this, 
there be, by fair implication, optimizing efforts 
and optimized communications processes among rivals 
as well as among cooperative states. 
IV 
Professor Grigori Tunkin has been selected as 
the leading Soviet jurist primarily to consider the 
claims that he is making for international law and 
to contrast those claims with those of Professor 
Myres S. McDougal. The comparisons that are made 
here are designed, primarily, to draw upon those 
claims that appear to be most representative of the 
Soviet Union and of the Western democracies. 
Accordingly, misperceptions in this analysis should 
be considered as part of an on-going process of 
clarification--and the correction and critique--
that is associated with the development of any 
science. 
Perhaps the two fundamental principles of 
Professor Tunkin relate to those of "consent" and 
to "peaceful coexistence.,,6 While the policy im-
plications of these principles, and the impacts 
of each of them on shaping a global community 
policy will be considered more fully, the principle 
of consent when related to international law, is 
the policy of the right of a "sovereign" state to 
determine when it will be legally bound by that 
law. The far-reaching impact of this perspective 
is seen when it is clear that consent applies to 
customary international law as well as treaty law. 
Moreover, Professor Tunkin argues that it is a 
principle that is shared by the emerging nations--
because they cannot be compelled to accept the 
traditional law that developed among the capitalist 
nations--and by the Soviet Union, because it is 
driving toward the development of new legal prin-
ciples more realistically identified and validated 
by the global social order. 
Professor Tunkin in appraising Article 38(b) 
of the International Court of Justice declares that 
"it {.;ould be more accurate" to use the words "recog-
nized as an international legal norm" instead of 
"accepted as law." Article 38(b) states: 
[Article 38 a.b] The Court, 
whose function is to decide in 
accordance with international 
law such disputes as are sub-
mitted to it, shall apply: 
b. international custom, as 
evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law. 
He then adduces from this argument and the 
more "accurate" rendition that the principle of 
consent is applicable to customary international 
law. But read in the context of the entire pro-
vision, Western scholars, and Western practice, 
treat the provision differently. It is a provision 
in which custom itself is identified as "evidence" 
of a general practice among states accepted as law. 
The final phrase of Art. 38(b)(1) relates to the 
end-product of a process--the outcome in which law 
emerges from custom and usage. The differing per-
spectives identified by Professor McDougal appears 
later in this paper. 
Clearly, however, we are facing differing 
interpretations and differing recommendations by 
jurists to policy-makers. As to these, Hans 
Kelsen declared in his THE LAW OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS [New York, 1950, p. xvi]: 
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The task of a scientific com-
mentary is first of all to find, 
by a critical analysis, the possible 
meanings of the legal norm under-
going interpretation; and then to 
show their consequences, leaving it 
to the competent authorities to choose 
from among the various possible inter-
pretations the one which they, for 
political reasons, consider to be 
preferable, and which they alone 
are entitled to select. A scien-
tific interpretation has to avoid 
giving countenance to the fiction 
that there is always but a single 
'correct' interpretation of the norms 
to be applied to concrete cases. 
This fiction, it is true, may have 
some political advantages. 
The deeper implications of Kelsen's observations 
have been suggested in this paper--particularly 
with respect to states making their claims and 
counterclaims, in cases such as these, over the 
meaning of legal norms, and more particularly with 
respect to fixed outcomes of a given methodology of 
interpretation. 
In order to assure that no confusion is at-
tached to this principle, the following citation* 
is invoked at length: [88-89] 
This conception is in crying contra-
diction with the basic generally rec-
ognized principles of modern 
international law, the principle of 
equality of states, in particular. 
It is beyond dispute that equality of 
states signifies only juridical 
equality, which may not accord with 
the actual inequality of states in 
international relations. There is 
a certain contradiction here between 
the real relations and juridical 
relations. No doubt the position 
of the majority of states, the Great 
Powers in the first place, is of 
decisive significance in the creation 
of generally accepted norms of inter-
national law are equivalent to each 
other. This juridical equality is of 
great importance. It means that in 
international relations no group of 
states, not even in majority of 
states, can create norms binding 
upon other states, or has the 
right to attempt to impose these 
norms upon other states. 
Customary norms of international law 
being a result of agreement among 
states, the sphere of action of such 
norms is limited to the relations 
between the states which accepted 
these norms as norms of international 
law, i.e., the states participating 
in this tacit agreement. 
*From Tunkin 
The sphere of action of a customary 
principle or customary norm of 
international law may gradually ex-
pand. This, as a rule, is the way 
customary norms of international 
law become generally recognized 
norms. There are several cases of 
he declaration of a single state 
becoming a point of departure. 
Many principles of international law 
were proclaimed, for instance, by 
revolutionary France in the 18th 
century. Among them were the prin-
ciples of respect of state sovereign-
ty, noninterference in the internal 
affairs of another state, equality 
of states, and the principle that 
war operations must be directed 
against military objects only and 
cannot be directed against the 
civilian population. The Soviet 
state has advanced the principle of 
banning aggressive wars and treating 
such wars as crimes, the principle 
of self-determination of nations, 
the principle of peaceful co-
existence, and a number of other 
principles of international law. 
In all these cases, the principles 
originally proclaimed by a single 
state were gradually recognized by 
other states and have become, partly 
by custom and partly by treaty, 
generally recognized principles 
of modern international law. 
This proposition about the spheres 
of influence of customary norms is 
of special significance to modern 
international law, which regulates 
the relations between states 
belonging to two opposed social 
systems. Only a customary rule 
which is recognized by the states 
of both systems can now be regarded 
as a customary norm of international 
law. 
The concept that customary norms of 
international law recognized as 
such by a large number of states are 
binding upon all states not only has no 
foundation in modern international law 
but it fraught with grave danger. This 
concept in essence justifies the attempts 
made by one group of states to impose 
upon other states, the socialist 
states, for instance, or the newly 
emerging states of Asia and Africa, 
certain customary norms which, while 
regarded perhaps by this group of 
states as customary norms of inter-
national law, have never been accepted 
by the new states and which may prove 
partly or wholly unacceptable to these 
new states. Obviously, this tendency 
to dictate norms of international 
law to other states is, under present 
conditions, doomed to failure. But 
it is no less obvious that such attempts 
at dictation may lead to grave inter-
national complications. 
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In practically all cases when it is 
necessary to establish the existence 
of one or another generally recog-
nized norm of international law, the 
usual procedure is to investigate if 
"universal practice" exists; and in 
case such practice does exist, if it 
has been recognized a s a norm of law, 
and how many states have recognized 
such practice as a norm of law. 
Because of the importance of the impact of 
this principle, further citations from Professor 
Tunkin are needed to establish its reach. 
Analyzing the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, he states in his text, THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, at pages 123-125: 
(2) A customary norm as the result 
and embodiment bf tacit consent. The 
operative sphere bf a customary norm. 
What is recognition by states of a 
specific rule as a norm of inter-
national law? What is the essence 
of such recognition? Recognition 
or acceptance by a state of a parti-
cular customary rule as a norm of law 
signifies an expression of a state's 
will, the consent of a state, to 
consider this customary rule to be a 
norm of international law. It must 
be emphasized that one is speaking of 
recognition "as a norm of international 
law" and not "as a legal norm" the 
norms of national legal systems of 
other states. Moreover, courts of 
states frequently apply norms of 
foreign law. 
But the Statute of the International 
Court refers to recognition of a 
particular rule as an international 
legal norm or, more precisely, of a 
norm of general international law. 
The Statute speaks of "general 
practice," "accepted as law"; that 
is, local customary international 
legal norms are pushed to the side. 
Such norms exist, although they do 
not play a large role in the general 
system of international law. 
Thus, the bonds between a state 
accepting a customary norm of inter-
national law and the other states 
who already have recognized this norm 
are basically identical with those 
bonds establihsed among states with 
the aid of an international treaty. 
Consequently, the essence of the 
process of creating a norm of inter-
national law by means of custom con-
sists of agreement between states, 
which in this case is tacit, and not 
clearly expressed, as in a treaty. 
If a customary norm of international 
law is the result of agreement between 
states, the operative sphere of this 
norm is limited to relations between 
states who have recognized it as a 
norm of international law, that is to 
to relations between those states 
who are parties to the corresponding 
tacit agreement. 
The operative sphere of a principle 
or customary norm of international 
law may gradually expand, and it is 
by this means, as a rule, that 
customary norms of international 
law become generally recognized. 
There are frequent instances when 
the declaration of a single state 
is a formative moment. Many prin-
ciples of international law were 
proclaimed, for example, by revo-
lutionary France in the eighteenth 
century. Among them are the 
principles of respect for state 
sovereignty, noninterference, 
equality of states, and the principle 
that military operations must be 
directed only against military ob-
jects and not against the civilian 
population, and others. In the 
Decree on Peace and other state 
documents, the Soviet state advanced 
the principles of the prohibition 
and criminality of aggressive war, 
the principle of self-determination 
of nations, the principle of peace-
ful coexistence, and a number of 
other principles of international 
law. 
One should not forget, however, the 
specific feature of international law 
that subjects of international are 
themselves the creators of norms 
of international law. The fact 
that states are bound by prevailing 
norms of international law does not 
preclude the possibility of their 
creating new norms of international 
law by treaty of custom that may 
differ from prevailing norms. With 
regard to norms of international 
law which are not of an imperative 
character, the question is resolved 
relatively simply. 
A new norm deviating from a prevailing 
norm (and, consequently, recognized 
by the respective powers) will, of 
course be binding only upon states 
which have recognized it, and this 
new norm replaces the respective old 
norm in relations among these 
countries. The latter, however, 
will be operative among states which 
still have not recognized the new 
norm gradually may be expanded at 
the expense of reducing the operative 
sphere of the old norm, and ultimately 
the new norm may completely supplant 
the old norm. 
Assuming that the principle of consent had 
been adopted by the Soviet Union as one of the 
fundamental principles of international law, this 
would mean or imply several policy features: 
(a) international customary law that Western 
states invoke or rely upon as the legitimatizing 
or legalizing basis establishing what is permis-
sible or impermissible will not necessarily 
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be "recognized" by the Soviet Union, in particular 
in those situations where it determines that it is 
not legally bound; (b) international treaty law 
operates most explicitly through an instrument 
clearly evidencing the consent of the Soviet Union, 
but even here that consent will depend upon what 
the Soviet Union perceives as the legally binding 
obligations established by the operative provi-
sions of the agreement, and, in the event of dis-
pute, will depend during negotiations for settle-
ment or adjustment, upon its perception of how far 
its consent has extended. 
Professor Tunkin enlarges upon the inter-
action of treaty law and customary international 
law, building however upon the full thrust of his 
notion of the principle of consent: First, it 
must be clarified that he is concerned with norms 
of international law--i.e., with the black-letter 
type rule, and not with law that falls short of a 
"norm" or general rule Tl42): 
International treaty and international 
custom are the two methods of 
creating norms of general interna-
tional law. The essence of these 
methods lies in agreement between 
states as regards recognition of a 
specific rule as a norm of inter-
national law •.•. In principle it is 
possible to change a customary norm 
by means of treaty and a treaty norm 
by means of custom. 
While treaty law is readily to be found, 
modifying customary international law, according 
to Professor Tunkin, the modification of treaties 
through customary international law--following 
the report of the International Law Commission 
[1964], and in particular the impact of sub-
se,quent practice of states--clarified by the 
Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear 
(Cambodia v. Thailand) [Merits, Judgment of 
15 June 1962]--must evidence the consent of 
the parties, that is, all of the parties: 
The Commission ~nternational Law 
Commission] was far from thinking 
that any practice might modify 
the provisions of a treaty. The 
Commissions's draft contains two 
essential elements. Practice must 
testify to an agreement of the 
parties to modify a provision of the 
treaty. As the Commission points out 
in the commentary to this article, 
"in formulating the rule in this 
way the Commission intended to indi-
cate that the subsequent practice 
even if every party might not itself 
have actively participated in the 
practice, must be such as to 
establish the agreement of the 
parties as a whole to the modifica-
tion in question." ~itations in 
the text].[145-6] 
The "regulations" of international organiza-
tions may also be accepted as international law--
the determining factor however is that of consent, 
and the the regulations are characterized "in 
essence" as "international treaties." [106]. 
However, the treaties of international 
organizations are "always of a secondary nature," 
i.e., "treaties of international organizations, in 
contrast to treaties between states, contain, at 
the present time at least, only local norms." 
[ 113] 
The consensual principle, coupled with the 
Marxist-Leninist perspective, compels Professor 
Tunkin to reject a global social and global legal 
order unless it is based upon !he comin$ together 
of the classless society. In accepting a "world 
state," he first declares that as states proceed 
to "socialism," they must over time cast aside 
the "deep roots of national discord and economic, 
political and cultural inequality," then 
observes [374]: 
It is necessary to point out that 
the view, widely held in the West, 
that the Soviet Union and Soviet 
jurists oppose a world state, oppose 
an effective international organiza-
tion, while western countries and 
western jurists favor a world state 
in principle and therefore an 
effective international organiza-
tion, is completely unjustified. 
Marxism-Leninism links the 
possibility of a world association 
of nations first and foremost with 
the liquidation of capitalism as 
the last exploitative socio-
economic formation and with the 
creation of a socialist society. 
"The purpose of socialism," wrote 
V.I. Lenin, "is not only to 
eliminate the splintering of man-
kind into petty states and any 
isolation of nations; is not 
only the rapprochement of nations 
but also their amalgamation." 
But in order to create the condi-
tions for this, more than just 
the liquidation of private owner-
ship and the creation of a 
socialist state is needed. Lenin 
pointed out that national and 
state differences among peoples 
and countries will last "for a very, 
very long time even after realiza-
tion of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat on a world-wide scale." 
Even on the domestic plane in a 
number of instances socialism inherits 
from capitalism such deep roots of 
national discord and economic, liqu-
date them. In international relations, 
naturally, the matter is far more 
complex. Each state represents both 
a political and an economic unit. 
With the various historical strata 
of contradictions between states 
and between nationalities are 
associated a number of econimic, 
political, cultural, and other 
problems. 
Within the framework of the world 
socialist system, however, these 
differences and contradictions 
gradually are being overcome on 
the basis of a new socialist social 
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structure and Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
Various forms of state unions of 
socialist states are possible on the 
path to a classless, stateless com-
munist society. The creation of a 
world federation or another form of 
uniting free states and nations is 
conceivable, therefore, only on the 
path of liquidating private ownership, 
exploitation, class and national 
contradictions, on the path of 
constructing socialism and communism. 
While the principles of consent and peaceful 
coexistence are the fundamental pillars in 
Professor Tunkin's framework of positive inter-
national law, a further dimension appears in his 
interpretation of the policy content of the United 
Nations Charter--i.e., the Charter itself entails 
the principle of peaceful coexistence p. 71-72]: 
The experience of states of the two 
systems R.e., socialist and 
capitalist] and, especially, the 
cooperation of these states during 
the Second Wrold War led to the 
principle of peaceful coexistence 
being placed at the base of the 
United Nations Organization .•.• 
Although the term "peaceful 
coexistence" is not used in the 
Charter, the principle of peaceful 
coexistence runs throughout the 
Charter of this international 
organization. The preamble of the 
Charter speaks of the determination 
"to save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war," "to establish 
conditions under which justice and 
respect for the obligations arising 
from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained." 
States are called upon "to practice 
tolerance and live together in peace 
with one another as good neighbors." 
[Article 1, further, sets forth the 
elements of peaceful coexistance]. 
Finally, the United Nations Charter 
says that this international organiza-
tion must be "a centre for harmonizing 
the actions of nations in the attain-
ment of these common ends," having in 
view, naturally, the harmonized actions 
of states of different social systems. 
The inclusion of the principle of 
peaceful coexistence in the United 
Nations Charter was a decisive state 
in the process of transforming this 
principle into a generally recognized 
principle of international law. 
For the detached observer, the policies sup-
ported by Professor Tunkin have the same force as 
the veto power that can be exercised in the 
Security Council of the United Nations. The over-
all thrust of this perspective is of course con-
sistent with the fundamental principles of Marxist-
Leninist framework for the Soviet Union itself--so 
that the "logic"of the framework is simply the 
outcome of Soviet perspectives (assuming again that 
Professor Tunkin correctly declares what these are 
in his text) regarding its own social order. 
The other fundamental principle is that of 
peaceful coexistence. This principle is identi-
fied as one that has "been further developed in 
documents of the Communist party of the Soviet 
Union and of the Soviet government, in the practi-
cpl policy of the Soviet state" (35). More 
specifically, the principle embraces a number of 
principles, described, and cited in, the Program 
of the Party, because it: 
presupposes: renunciation of 
war as a means of deciding 
questions in dispute among states, 
settling them by negotiations; 
equality, mutual understanding, 
and trust among states, having 
regard to each other's interests; 
noninterference in internal 
affairs, recognizing for every 
people the right independently 
to decide all questions of their 
own country; strict respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all countries; the 
development of economic and 
cultural cooperation on the basis 
of complete equality and mutual 
advantage. 05-36) 
Peaceful coexistence, in its more specific 
context, embraces the following: (a) realistic 
perception that there is a "struggle" to be 
maintained as ideological or as opposing value 
struggle between the socialist and capitqlist 
social orders; (b) full support iNr-"'/~,nnilitary 
suppor~ and assistance to liberation movements 
involv~ in wars of liberation against the 
capitalist social orders; (c) identification of all 
liberation struggles and those of the socialist 
states as "just wars;" and (d) the ultimate realiza-
tion of the Marxist-Leninist goal in which the 
claims to private property and the existence of 
social orders based upon classes, with their 
inevitable class struggle, will disappear with the 
rise of the socialist commonwealth of states. 
Professor Tunkin declares in the following 
passage [35-37): 
The Leninist teaching on the 
peaceful coexistence of socialist 
and capitalist states has been 
further developed in documents 
of the Communist party of the 
Soviet Union and of the Soviet 
government, in the practical policy 
of the Soviet state. A detailed 
characterization of peaceful 
coexistence has been given in the 
Program of the CPSU. "Peaceful 
coexistence," says the Program of 
the CPSU, "presupposes: renuncia-
tion of war as a means of deciding 
questions in dispute among states, 
settling them by negotiations; 
equality, mutual understanding, and 
trust among states, having regard 
to each other's interests; noninter-
ference in internal affairs, recognizing 
for every people the right independent-
ly to decide all questions of their 
own country; strict respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all countries; the 
development of economic and 
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cultural cooperation on the basis 
of complete equality and mutual 
advantage. 
Peaceful coexistence is not some 
sort of idealist concept, divorced 
from reality; it reflects the laws 
of relations among socialist and 
capitalist states. 
Relations among states always have 
been characterized by w struggle 
among them. The roots of this 
struggle, which had a varying degree 
of intensity, are found in the class 
contradictions of society. 
The concept of peaceful coexistence 
is based on and reflects this law. 
"Peaceful coexistence," says the 
Program of the CPSU, "serves as 
the basis of peaceful competition 
between socialism and capitalism 
on an international scale and is a 
specific form of class struggle 
between them." 
Of course, states, not classes, enter 
into international relations; inter-
national relations are relations 
among states. But the foreign 
policy of states is determined by 
the predominant classes in these 
states; this is class policy. 
Therefore, the struggle of the 
two systems, socialist and capitalist, 
affects relations among socialist 
and capitalist states. 
Thus, the specific feature of this 
"class struggle" consists, first 
and foremost, in the fact that this 
struggle manifests itself in relations 
among states, and not directly between 
classes. 
At the same time, the concept of 
peaceful coexistence does not 
allow every means of struggle 
among states; it precludes armed 
struggle and permits only peaceful 
competition among them. Conse-
quently, reflecting the true 
inevitability of struggle among 
states of the two systems, the 
concept of peaceful coexistence 
includes this struggle. But 
struggle does not preclude coopera-
tion. In reality, struggle and 
cooperation exist simultaneously 
in relations among states of the 
two systems and in international 
relations in general; cooperation 
has been permeated by struggle. 
The intensity of struggle and the 
degree of cooperation differ in 
relations among various and 
between one and the same states 
on various questions and at various 
times. 
In defining the position of the CPSU 
on this question, the Secretary 
General of the Central Committee 
of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev, 
stated in one of his recent 
speeches: "The CPSU has pro-
ceeded and is proceeding from 
the fact that class struggle of 
the two systems--capitalist and 
socialist--in the sphere of 
economics, politics, and, of 
course, ideology will continue. 
It could not be otherwise, for 
the world view and class 
objectives of socialism and 
capitalism are opposed and ir-
reconcilable. But we shall 
strive so that this histori-
cally inevitable struggle follows 
a course not threatened by wars 
dangerous conflicts, or an un-
controlled arms race. This will 
be an enormous gain for the cause 
of peace throughout the world and 
for the interests of all peoples 
and all states •• 
The far-reaching implications of this prin-
ciple of peaceful coexistence will be appreciated 
only as the "correlation of forces in the world 
arena" (42) strengthen the socialist community. 
During this period the transition in policy sense 
from capitalism and socialism will take place 
~l), and the capitalist system--identified by 
Professor Tunkin as states "whose social system 
is characterized by the existence of private 
ownership and of the means of production and the 
exploitqtion of man by man" (36) ,--will be 
replaced by a socialist social order. The prin-
ciple of peaceful coexistence presupposes, building 
upon the principle of consent discussed earlier, 
that the capitalist and socialist states can 
enter into international agreements. But it is 
clearly implied in the context of Professor 
Tunkin's text that these international agreements 
must serve the socialist--i.e., Marxist-Leninist--
goals, tactics or strategies or they would by 
definition be unacceptable to the socialist 
states. 
The full policy impact of the principle 
appears in the following statement in which peace-
ful coexistence is said to be unable to embrace 
policies that oppose communism--and in the context 
in which the statement appears--Marxist-Leninism, 
and its value demands: 
The concept that during the past 
fifty years the developmental 
base of general international 
law has contracted in consequences 
of the existence of states of two 
opposed social systems and opposed 
ideologies, as well as the emergence 
of a large numberof new states whose 
cultural heritage is substantailly 
different from western civilization, 
is widely disseminated in the 
bourgeois doctrine of international 
law. Politically, this concept 
reflects first and foremost the 
influence of the policy of anti-
communism, which rejects peaceful 
coexistence of states with opposed 
social systems and the possibility 
of agreement between them. Bourgeois 
legal doctrine is its theoretical 
9 
base. [22-23) 
In short, Professor Tunkin's perspectives 
draw upon policy content--but that policy content 
and its context are limited to those of Marxist-
Leninist, and to the inevitable suppression of 
capitalism and imperialism in the "struggle" 
between the two social systems. The invocation of 
a global public or legal order would be meaningless 
under these perspectives if that order were to en-
tail capitalist or democratic value demands of the 
capitalist systems. And most fundamental are the 
two principles of consent with regard to what law 
shall be binding and peaceful coexistence, operat-
ing together to legitimatize the Soviet policy 
goals that are associated with supporting its own 
policies under Marxist Leninism. 
Professor Tunkin claims that through 
Marxist-Leninist framework he is afforded the only 
theory that "allows us to explain scientifically 
both the existence of contemporary general inter-
national law and its social nature." This theory 
shows that such law develops "on the basis of the 
general tenets of historical materialism." In 
summary: 
International law, just as law 
in general, is a category of the 
superstructure. Therefore, the 
general law of the development of 
human society having the closest 
relationship to international law 
is the law of the dependence of 
the social structure on the base; 
that is, the economic structure of 
society. (234) 
Applying the policies of Marxist-Leninism, 
with their impact on law and upon policy in 
general, and their larger impact upon the inevitable 
development of the social orders within and among 
states, Professor Tunkin claims that the forces 
within the socialist states have a monopoly on 
promoting peace, because: 
..the principal factor in 
increasing the effectiveness 
of the United Nations as an 
instrument of peace and inter-
national cooperation is the 
forces which could exert 
pressure upon the ruling 
classes and the governments 
of states whose policy does 
not correspond to the interests 
of peace and consequently the 
requirements of the United 
Nations Charter. There are 
such forces in modern society; 
these are the forces of peace. 
(380) 
Of course, the Western scholar is certain to 
find these perspectives ambiguous, assertive and 
inconsistent with his own. But he may, like 
Professor Myres S. McDougal find that they are 
tendentious promoting the policies of one state, 
and insisting that those policies for the purposes 
of that state and in general must be established. 
The fundamental policy in Professor McDougal's 
approach is to seek the optimization of human 
dignity, within social orders and among them. This 
is consistent with the Western tradition of 
democratic orders and processes. 
Law--both municipal and international law--has 
always been policy oriented, but the policies of 
law are often frozen, from the policies and condi-
tions affecting those policies, when the law was 
first crystalized into norm, rule or standard. 
Moreover, legal policy has tended to be identified 
with legalistic policy--with policy that is limited 
to promoting the limited perspectives of a rigid 
legal order and legal process. In modern times, 
however, the policies of public law have shifted 
so that they embrace the larger decision flow of 
states and their governments, but are distin-
guished from that flow by the authority associated 
with iegal decisions, by their controlling effect 
on the decisions, and by their policy content. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, a noted American jurist, 
declared: 7 
It is revolting to have no 
better reason for a rule of law 
than that so it was laid down 
in the time of Henry IV. It is 
still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid 
down have vanished long since, 
and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past. 
The policy framework of Professor McDougal is 
best expressed by the following: 
It is easiest to understand 
international law by recalling 
our notions of law in any 
community. It has already been 
suggested that, .• . , law is best 
regarded as a process of authori-
tative decision in which the members 
of a community collectively--
through the careful articulation 
of shared demands and expectations 
and the employment of many different 
institutions and intellectual 
procedures--seek to clarify and 
secure their common interests. 
By a community we make reference 
to any territorial grouping within 
which the members are constrained by 
interdeterminations or interdepen-
dencies in the shaping and sharing 
of values. In any particular com-
munity there can be observed, among 
its value processes, a process of 
effective power in the sense that 
decisions are made and enforced, by 
severe deprivations or high indul-
gences, irrespective of the im-
mediate wishes of the targets of 
decision. Upon close exmaination 
these effective power decisions may 
be observed to be of two different 
kinds: first, those that are taken 
by sheer naked power or calculations 
of expediency; and second, those 
that are made in accordance with 
community expectations about how, and 
with what content, they should be 
made. It is these latter authoritative 
decisions, those made in accordance 
with community expectation and 
disposing of enough effective power 
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to be put into controlling 
practice, that, we suggest, are 
in any community most appropriately 
regarded as law. 
A careful examination of the com-
prehensive process of authoritative 
decision within any particular com-
munity will reveal that this process, 
also, is made up of two different 
kinds of decisions. There are the 
decisions that establish and maintain 
the process of authoritative decision 
and there are the decisions made by 
this process in controlling and regu-
lating the different value processes 
within the community. Decisions of 
the first type identify and character-
ize authoritative decision-makers, 
state and specifiy basic community 
policies, establish appropriate 
structures of authority, allocate 
bases of power for sanctioning pur-
poses, authorize procedures for the 
making of different kinds of decisions, 
and secure the performance of all the 
various kinds of decisions (intel-
ligence, promoting, prescription, 
invocation, application, termination 
and appraisal) necess8TY to the 
effective administration of community 
policies. These are the decisions 
that we label "constitutive," with 
reference obviously somewhat broader 
than the more traditional word 
"constitutional." The second kind 
of decision, which for convenience, 
we may call "public order," emerging 
in continuous flow from constitutive 
process, are those that determine how 
wealth is produced and distributed, 
how human rights are promoted and 
protected, or not protected from 
deprivation, how enlightenment is 
encouraged or blighted, how health 
is fostered or neglected, how 
rectitude and civic responsibility 
are matured or repressed, and so on 
through the whole gamut of community 
values. Any comprehensive inquiry 
about the law, past or future, of 
a community must accordingly take 
into account the entire flow within 
that community of both constitutive 
and public order decisions. 
A policy-oriented framework of inquiry 
has, thus, no difficulty in observing, 
as we have already in some measure 
documented, that humankind does today 
constitute a global or earth-space 
community, entirely comparable to 
its internal component communities, 
in the sense of interdetermination 
and interdependences in the shaping 
and sharing of values. It is the 
larger community process, composed 
of many different and interpene-
trating lesser community processes, 
which stimulates claims to authorita-
tive decision, affects the process of 
decision, and is in turn affected by 
decision. It is, hence, indispensable 
to effective inquiry to have 
a realistic map or model of 
the larger global process. 
For the relations among states, this policy 
framework is perceived against the competitive 
social and power processes, because, perceived 
realistically, states in tbeir practice are found 
to seek influence, prestige, respect, and to 
secure these through power and through values that 
support either their acquisition of power, or 
their denial of power to others. As with 
Professor Tunkin, change is accommodated in this 
approach. Professors Lasswell and Kaplan de-
clared, for example: 9 
The experiential data of poli-
tical science.are acts.considered 
as affecting or determinin~ other 
acts, a relation embodied in the 
key concept ·of power. Political 
science, as an empirical discipline 
is the study of the shaping and 
sharing of power. 
This empirical grounding of 
political abstractions may be 
expressed by formulating the sub-
ject matter of political science 
in terms of a certain class of 
events (including "subjective" 
events), rather than timeless 
institutions or political patterns. 
We deal with power as a process in 
time, constituted by experientially 
localized and observable acts. 
Both structures and functions are 
construed as abstractions from 
what is empirically given as 
process. This orientation in 
political inquiry may be desig-
nated the principle of temporality. 
The principle of temporality does 
not imply a concern with only 
changes in situations rather than 
with states of affairs. Inquiry 
deals with both sorts of problems 
and may be designated as equi-
librium or developmental analysis 
accordingly. 
Some resemblance to one aspect of the prin-
ciple of peaceful coexistence appears in this 
perspective, because while that principle is 
directed to a pre-ordained outcome, it must deal 
with adjustments between nations with differing 
perspectives. However, while the theory of 
Professor Tunkin presupposes the pre-ordained 
outcome, the theory of Professor McDougal and 
others presupposes only that adjustment itself 
may be the outcome, and will be a prolonged 
process at least as long as nations do not 
destroy each other and the earth itself. To 
this end the publicist Walter Lippmann noted: lO 
When full allowance has been 
made for deliberate fraud, 
political science has still to 
account for such facts as two 
nations attacking one another, 
each convinced that it is acting 
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in self-defense, or two classes 
of war, each certain that it 
speakes for the common interest. 
They live, we are likely to say, 
in different worlds. More 
accurately, they live in the 
same world, but they think and 
feel in different ones. It is to 
these special worlds, it is to 
these private, or group, or class, 
or provincial, or occupation, or 
sectarian artifacts, that the 
political adjustment of mankind in 
the great society takes place. 
How do states behave in a competitive power 
process? Because they are seeking power, how do 
they seek to acquire that power? What appeals are 
drawn to common goals--of mutual security, of 
global order, of the maintenance of international 
peace and security? Professor McDougal extends his 
inquiry beyond the traditional law into the 
strategic instruments of policy--into those that 
are ideological, economic, and diplomatic as well 
as military. A variety of changing strategies is 
examined and the connection of these policy-
oriented activities with the emergence of with 
the choices that are made to shaping law are 
identified. Such strategies--and the choices 
involved--may extend to the negotiation and con-
clusion of international treaties and agreements, 
but then they may also be extended to the actions, 
policies and decisions relating to the kind of 
customary international law that is expected or 
identified with the larger goals of community 
policy. 
Analysis and inquiry into these larger and 
enveloping processes demand a comprehensive frame-
work that enables the scholar to perceive and to 
follow the development of law itself, to see its 
limitations, particularly when expressed against 
the policy goals expected from law, and to provide 
the decision and policy-maker with alternatives, 
choices or modifications to his own. The norms 
of international law--Iargely prescriptive in 
nature when we look to global processes--are in 
place, but for the purposes of effective regula-
tion of the use of force there is missing the 
institutional and procedural framework, as the 
followiyg excerpt of Professor McDougal makes 
clear: l 
The public order established and 
maintained by global constitutive 
process could be described in terms 
of the protection afforded and 
regulation achieved by authorita-
tive decision with respect to every 
feature of global social process. 
The trend would appear, again, 
toward a slow improvement in an 
emerging global society, though a 
society not as well managed, or as 
secure, as the society achieved in 
more mature national communities. 
The most comprehensive description 
would make reference to the degree 
to which the different participants 
in global social process are protected 
in the establishment and maintenance 
of their own internal constitutive 
and public order processes and in 
their interactions with other 
participants; the extent to 
which appropriate situations 
of interaction in all the 
different value processes are 
maintained about the world: 
the modalities by which the 
different resources comprising 
the physical environment--Iand 
masses, rivers, oceans, air space, 
outer space, atmosphere, and so 
on--are allocated for inclusive 
and exclusive uses and how these 
uses are regulated and protected; 
the degree of 9uccess achieved 
in facilitating persuasive, and 
in restraining and minimizing 
coercive, employment of the various 
strategies (diplomatic, ideolo-
gical, economic, and military) 
in the shaping and sharing of 
values; and, finally and most 
importantly, the degree to which 
demanded outcomes in the differ-
ent value processes (wealth, 
resepct, enlightenment, and so 
on) are in fact achieved and 
protected. It is possible 
here only to make brief and sug-
gestive indication of the kind 
of detail that would be relevant 
in such comprehensive inquiry. 
The protection accorded the 
nation-state in global social 
process is, for quick illustra-
tion, the principle subject matter 
of traditional conceptions of inter-
national law. It is the global 
constitutive process that identifies 
which territorial entities are to 
be regarded as "nation-states" and 
establishes their "legal personality" 
in process of authoritative decision, 
specifies what purposes are permis-
sible to these entities in their 
interactions with other such 
entities and lesser participants, 
indicates the structures of 
authority (internal constitutive 
processes) required of a nation-
state for effective participation 
in external affairs with other 
states, regulates the acquisi-
tion of, and sharing in the enjoy-
ment of, bases of power (resources, 
people) by different nation-states, 
seeks to control the exercise by 
nation-states of the different 
instruments of policy in both 
persuasion and coercion, and, 
finally, allocates among the 
different nation-states the compe-
tences ("jurisdiction") to engage 
in the various authority functions 
(prescribing, applying, and so on) 
in the making and application of law 
to events in global social process. 
In a vast and continuing flow of 
decision, global constitutive process 
establishes for any particular terri-
torial community a modest but viable 
security in relation to all these 
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.different features of inter-
action. 
The obvious Achilles heel in 
global public order is in the 
failure of constitutive process 
to establish enough effective 
control over the different na-
tion-states to preclude resort 
to unauthorized coercion and 
violence. The number one problem 
of humankind remains, as we have 
indicated above, that of security 
in the sense of establishing a 
minimum order, in control of un-
authorized coercion and violence, 
which will permit more effective 
pursuit of an optimum order in 
maximization of the shaping and 
sharing of all values. Through 
articles 2(4) and 51 of the United 
Nations Charter, and many ancillary 
prescriptions, the global community 
has at long last achieved a work-
able distinction between impermis-
sible and permissible coercion, 
admitting of application in parti-
cular instances in support of 
minimum order. It remains, however, 
for the community to establish an 
appropriate institutional framework 
both for disinterested, third-party 
appraisal of particular instances 
of alleged impermissible coercion 
and for the application of appro-
priate sanctioning measures in 
preventing and deterring coercion 
and in restoring and rehabilitating 
public order. Though contemporary 
nation-states receive tremendous 
benefits from constitutive process, 
they have as yet been only imperfectly 
subjected to its complementary 
burdens. 
Customary international law, in these per-
spectives, unlike those of Professor Tunkin, is 
an enterprise related to the choices evidenced in 
the behavior of states. Even if states are free 
to act as they choose, or even if they insist 
upon such freedom, they reveal what they believe 
to be the legitimate or permissible way to act by 
acting. The communications in this process 
relating to custom, and ultimately to customary 
international law, appear in the actions, but also 
the accompanying statements, declarations, and 
claims that they are making to each other. 
Professor McDougal identifies the proc2ss in which 
customary international law develops:1 
The technical requirements for 
establishing a customary pre-
scription in international law 
are, despite some controversy 
among the doctors, most fre-
quently stated as embracing 
"two essential elements": 
a "material" element in certain 
past uniformities in behavior 
and a "psychological" element, or 
opinio juris, in certain subjec-
tives of "oughtness" attending the 
uniformities in behavior. It is, 
nevertheless, easily observed, 
and generally agreed, that both 
these required elements admit 
of flexible and many varying 
interpretations. The relevant 
uniformities in behavior may 
include the acts and utterances 
not only of officials, national 
and international, located at 
many different positions in 
structures of authority, but 
even of individuals and repre-
sentatives of private associa-
tions and nongovernmental 
pressure groups. Such acts 
may also vary enormously in 
the amount of repetition they 
exhibit and in the duration of 
time through which they occur. 
The subjectivities of oughtness 
required to attend such uniformi-
ties of behavior, which subjec-
tivities may on occasion be 
proved by mere reference to the 
uniformities in behavior, may 
relate to many different systems 
of nroms, such as prior authority, 
morality, natural law, reason, or 
religion. The honoring in law-
creating consequences even of 
subjectivities asserted in the 
beginning in direct contravention 
of prior authority in fact suggests 
as we have intimated above, that 
the only subjectivities required 
are those merely of expectation of 
future uniformities in decision, 
whatever the accompanying norms 
of justification. Similarly, the 
factual or literary evidences to 
which decision-makers are 
authorized to resort for informa-
tion about past behavior and 
subjectivities embrace not merely 
the familiar items of international 
agreements, resolutions of inter-
national organizations, public 
utterances by international and 
national officials, diplomatic 
correspondence and instructions, 
the writings of publicists, and 
so on, but also "every written 
document, every record of act or 
spoken word which presents an 
authentic picture of the practice 
of states in their international 
dealings." 
Professor Tunkin, it will be recalled, built 
his theory upon the consent of states. They 
must consent to legally binding obligations. 
They may also enjoy equality, sovereignty, in-
dependence, but each of these, in the legal 
sense, falls under consent, and to a large 
extent, consent may be implicitly related to 
power. The consent of a smaller state to the 
demands of a larger state may, in the appropriate 
negotiations, be simply deference to the power 
of the larger or more powerful nation. The same 
possibility of deference or submission lies with 
the deeper implications of equality and 
sovereignty, or even with the right to enjoy 
the freedom of unopposed domestic 
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jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 2(7) of the 
United Nations Charter. 
The larger perspective entertained by 
Professor McDougal leads to the growing web of 
customary rTIternational law, ultimately denying 
all states, large or small, the claim that it is 
withholding consent to legal obligations. The 
enveloping web is one that operates in a way 
through "precedent," so that states become the 
beneficiaries and also the subjects of their prior 
decisions, actions and policies: they are not 
free under this perspective to adopt one policy 
today, and then later to repudiate it, if the 
global community has been led to perceive the 
actions of that states and others as actions and 
decisions that must conform to law. They are 
subject to trends in the decision flow--perhaps 
a more precise perspective than that of prece-
dents these they oppose if they refuse to be 
a member of the global community. According to 
Professor McDougal these trends enable us, inter 
alia, to follow the development of law and 
policy:l3 
[Trend thinking] considers 
the shape of things to come re-
gardless of preference. His 
goals clarified, a policy-maker 
must orient himself correctly in 
contemporary trends and future 
probabilities. Concerned with 
specific features of the future 
that are ever emerging from the past, 
he needs to be especially sensitive 
to time, and to forecast with 
reasonable accuracy passage from 
one configuration of events to 
the next. For this purpose 
he must have at his disposal a 
vast array of facts properly 
organized and instantly acces-
sible .... The results of trend 
thinking must continually be 
evaluated by the policy-maker in 
the light of his goals; the task 
is to think creatively about how 
to alter, deter, or accelerate 
probable trends in order to shape 
the future closer to his desire. 
But Professor Tunkin argues that the concept 
of community is without foundation, and hence he 
might insist that the growth of community, whose 
law and policy are inconsistent with that 
established under the tenets of Marxist-Leninism, 
is illusory or at best transitory. At page 27 
in his treatise, he points out that law--seemingly 
the traditional law from the context of the 
excerpt below--does not have its basis in 
community: 
The concept that the basis of law 
is community, particularly a com-
mon ideology, is completely un-
founded. Proponents of this 
concept frequently point out 
that in the absence of a specific 
community between people, the 
existence of law in general and of 
international law in particular 
is impossible. Of course, in 
the absence of a specific 
community between people, the 
existence of human society, 
and consequently of law, is 
inconceivable, but it still 
does not follow that this 
community is the reason for 
the formation of law or is 
reflected in law. The 
history of human society 
shows completely the 
opposite: in a pre-class 
society, where this com-
munity between people was 
more significant, there 
was no law: only with the 
emergence of class contradic-
tions, with the destruction 
of the tribal community, does 
law emerge. 
Law, including international 
law, emerged not as a result 
of an increase in community 
among people, but as a result 
of the division of society into 
classes and the formation of 
new class contradictions un-
known to tribal society. Inter-
national law, just as municipal 
law, is a phenomenon peculiar to 
a class society. 
The theoretical unfoundedness of 
the concept of a common ideology 
as a necessary condition for the 
existence and development of inter-
national law does not make this 
concept less dangerous. 
While both Professor Tunkin and Professor 
McDougal have identified the policy orientation of 
law, and the policy projection inherent in the 
legal process, it is evident from the materials 
presented so far that what they expect from the 
legal process varies substantially. Professor 
Tunkin clearly espouses the policies of his 
government and projects those policies into 
international law. These are not policies that 
are to be shared on the basis of compromise or 
adjustment with the opposing, competing or 
differing policies of the Western states. They 
are, through the principle of peaceful coexistence, 
policies to supplement those that are no longer 
needed in the traditional international law as the 
Marxist-Leninist structure for the allocation of 
authority and competence emerges among states. 
Moreover, there are no alternatives: while the 
period of transition may be long, the ultimate 
outcome is not in doubt. 
Global public order under the perspectives of 
Professor Tunkin is one, then, that remains very 
loose in its organizational features, because 
there is no possibility for accommodation toward 
a global order that embodies the economic per-
spectives of the capitalist states. The class 
nature within those states are the "deep roots of 
wars," according to Professor Tunkin: 
The theoretical unfoundedness 
of bourgeois concepts and plans 
to create a world state is 
determined by the basic unfounded-
ness of bourgeois methodology, 
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which is characterized by the 
divorcing of the superstructure 
from the base. A state is 
regarded as something that can 
be reconstructed as a cardinal 
form at the will of politicians 
and jurists irrespective of the 
economic structure of society. 
The causes of war, whose liquida-
tion is the leitmotif of all plans 
for a world state, bourgeois 
scholars misrepresent as state 
sovereignty, whereas the very 
existence of sovereign states is 
a nature consequence of the 
economic structure of society, and 
both sovereignty and the state 
will disappear only when this 
structure is changed. 
The deep roots of wars are found 
in the economic system and in the 
specific class structure of society 
which it determines. Moreover, 
bourgeois concepts of a world 
state originate, and by their 
class nature cannot but originate, 
from the possibility of creating 
a world state and liquidating wars 
without affecting the economic 
system of capitalism. [375] 
Professor Tunkin believes that a world state 
would oppose "social revolutions" because such 
plans "are linked in imperialist ideology with 
the struggle against social revolutions and the 
national liberation movement." The proposals 
for a world state, in short, are an ideological 
strategy, misleading peoples "both on the internal 
and international plane." On the one hand they 
"parry the blow from the capitalist system, 
alleging the roots of wars are not linked. On the 
other, they undermine the very cause of peace 
itself.~ [375-7]. 
Of course, the support of "social" revolutions 
is not limited to Marx, nor to Marxist-Leninist 
teachings, nor to the policies of the socialist 
bloc. Thomas Jefferson supported such revolutions, 
and, though some argue without evidence that he 
would even have supported revolutions by violence, 
his primary goal was to ensure that society itself 
would be able to adjust. And he foresaw that the 
progressive social orders would have provisions 
and expectations for adjustment structured within 
them, and the procedures and processes (e.g., 
voting, referendum, and so. on) to enable such 
adjustment to proceed. 
Professor Tunkin, and other Soviet commenta-
tors, find ample provision for the subordinate 
principles flowing from the principle of peaceful 
coexistence in the United Nations Charter, and, 
they have identified most of the purposes and 
objectives of the Charter against the perspectives 
of coexistence. But it is clear that the principle 
extends deep into an on-going, future oriented 
policy, to be aided, where appropriate, by deliber-
ate actions and assistance. The declaration of 
General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union before the 
26th Congress unambiguously proclaims full support 
against what must clearly be the Western world: 14 
Comrades, declares Brezhnev, no 
one should doubt that the CPSU 
will continue to consistently 
pursue a course aimed at the 
development of cooperation 
between the USSR and the 
liberated countries and at 
the consolidation of the al-
liance of world socialism 
and the national liberation. 
Moreover, there is no room for compromise 
with regard to these perspectives. They are not 
only irreconcilable according to Professor Tunkin 
with those of the bourgeois states, but they are 
inevitable, and must not be opposed, or there is 
the possibility that peace itself will be en-
dangered. Victor P. Karpov, while First 
Secretary of the Embassy of the Soviet Union in 
Washington, made this abundantly clear in sum-
marizing his own essay, "The Soviet Concept of 
Peaceful Coexistence and its Implications for 
International Law,"lS 
We are convinced that the 
principle of peaceful co-
existence should be the 
basic of the whole structure 
of contemporary international 
law. Only if it is based on 
the principle of peaceful co-
existence can international 
law best promote the cause of 
peace and mutual understanding 
between nations. 
The perspectives of Professor McDougal reveal 
instead how states are behaving in their relation-
ships with each other under current circumstances. 
They have at best a loosely organized community. 
This community affords them minimum order and 
security, and unless sustained, they will fall 
back increasingly upon unilateral measures to 
achieve order out of enveloping chaos and anarchy, 
primarily through their own power, particularly 
military power. However, the global community 
at large has adopted norms--important to enough of 
them to be projected as law regulating the primary 
concern that they all share, i.e., law regulating 
the use of force. Unquestionably, the effective-
ness of this law is dependent upon enforcement. 
But this is presently dependent primarily upon 
the checks and balancing that arises in the deter-
rence equilibrium regarding the nuclear weapons. 
Until an effective means to replace the checks 
and balancing process appears, that process must 
be nurtured to include the weapons emerging from 
the advancing military technologies. Yet, it must 
be stressed, the process of checks and balancing 
is dependent almost entirely on the communications 
involved in the threats and counterthreats to use 
or at least to have available the very weapons 
that are being checked. This, of course, 
provides--and reflects--the ambiguous basis of 
relations among states in their competitive power 
process. 
Emphasizing the shaping of global social 
processes as a positive approach to this problem, 
Professor McDougal draws attention to the inter-
action of decision, policy, law and enforcement in 
the following excerpt l6 : 
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Systems of public order are em-
bedded in a larger context of 
world events which is the entire 
social process of the globe. 
We speak of "process" because 
there is interaction, of "social 
because living beings are the 
active participants, of "world" 
because the expanding circles of 
interaction among men ultimately 
reach the remotest inhabitants of 
the globe •••• Within the vast social 
process of man pursuing values 
through institutions utilizing 
resources, we are especially con-
cerned with the characteristic 
features of the power porcess •.. 
Within the decision-making process 
our chief interest is in the legal 
process, by which we mean the making 
of authoritative and controlling 
decisions. Authority is the struc-
ture of expectation concerning who, 
with what qualifications and mode 
of selection, is competent to make 
decisions by what- criteria and what 
procedures. By control we refer to 
an effective voice in decision, 
whether authorized or not. The 
conjunction of common expectations 
concerning authority with a high 
degree of corroboration in actual 
operation is what we understand by 
law •.•• Within the distinctions thus 
developed, we are able to clarify 
what is meant by a system of public 
order. The reference is to the 
basic features of the social process 
in a community--including both the 
identity and preferred distribution 
pattern of basic goal values, and 
the implementing institutions--that 
are accorded protection by the legal 
process. 
VI 
Conclusions to an inquiry into perspectives 
relating to regulating the use of force among 
states are always, at best, tentative. Two 
leading commentators have been chosen to review 
the prominent perspectives of jurists that come 
from the Soviet Union and the United States, and 
it is obvious that such an inquiry can be at best 
preliminary. But such an inquiry is fruitful 
because it enables, through comparison, for an 
approach to be made concerning theories about law, 
the legal process, and the legal order. Moreover, 
it is part of the larger process of clarification--
a task that is imposed relentlessly upon the 
detached scholarly observer if he is to seek and 
make useful proposals for alternative policies and 
decisions. 
Professor Tunkin's principles that supplement 
or are embraced by, the principle of peaceful co-
existence provide his framework for regulating the 
use of force--at least in normative or prescriptive 
terms. While little emphasis is given to the 
critical policy functions identified in the applica-
tion, recommendations for modification and shaping, 
appraisals, and even for the interpretation and 
where appropriate the termination of the proposed 
norms, Professor Tunkin indicates the wider reach 
in such principles as the principles of non-
aggression [49 et seq.], peaceful settlement of 
disputes [57 et seq.], self-determination of 
peoples [60 et seq.], the principle of peaceful 
coexistence itself [69 et seq.], disarmament 
[75 et seq.], respect for human rights, [79 et 
seq.], and prohibition of war propaganda [83 et 
seq.], and includes the renunciation of the use 
of force in the principle of nonaggression. 
Clearly he intends that all of these prin-
ciples are mutually supportipg and reinforcing 
in their impact. But ~~principle of nonaggres-
sion, __ "emerged at fhst as the prohibition 
of aggressive war, being transformed later into 
the principle of the prohibition of the use or 
threat of force." Treaties and international 
agreements embodying this principle are traced 
by Professor Tunkin, and the United Nations 
Charter--Articles 2(4) and 2(3) in particular--is 
marked as "an important new stage in the develop-
ment of the principle of nonaggression." [52]. 
Yet Professor Tunkin's observations are 
ambiguous in this important context. He 
seemingly suggests that while international law 
provides valuable norms and that such norms 
appear to be the end product of its effort, it 
leads toward the application of a higher prin-
ciple of peaceful coexistence--operating directly 
but not necessarily as law upon the relations 
among states: 
Contemporary international law 
prohibits states from resorting 
to war against other states. 
But this does not mean, of 
course, that with the emergence 
of the principle of nonaggression 
international law as a system 
of norms regulating specific 
social relations has become 
weaker. The international 
legal prohibition of aggres-
sive war undoubtedly was a step 
forward on the path of trans-
forming international law into 
a more effective measures means 
of securing peace, of developing 
the peaceful coexistence of 
states. A~ if with the prohibi-
tion of aggressive war international 
law turned its face toward peace 
for the first time in history, 
then its role in securing peaceful 
coexistence has grown and it con-
sequently has become more 
effective. [56] 
The ambiguity in these observations arises 
from the language used--perhaps through the trans-
lation itself--because, while it stresses the 
principle of peaceful coexistence as operating to 
assist policy during the transition presupposed 
by Professor Tunkin from a global grouping of 
states with capitalist and socialist systems to a 
grouping of states entirely with socialist 
or communist systems, it is also, subsequently 
identified as a principle of international law. 
In either event, the purpose is clear: the 
principle of peaceful coexistence operates as the 
"higher law," a kind of ground-norm for the 
transition. In this sense, it bears resemblance 
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to those who professed a "higher law" in the 
natural law, and earlier in the "divine law" 
legitimatizing the absolute power of the 
Medieval kings. 
With the emerging minimum order for outer 
space now in view, the other principles might 
quickly be mentioned. The policy goals associated 
with Professor Tunkin's principles would then need 
attainment. For example, the principle of 
disarmament would call for "general and complete 
disarmament," replacing the arms control features 
and deterrence equilibria that now characterize 
the undertakings regarding outer space. [75 et 
seq.]. This would be closely associated with the 
operation of nonaggression, but the principle, so 
far, has not reached the stage where it can be 
said to be "completely formulated." [78 et seq.]. 
Accordingly, what is needed, presumably to fulfill 
the principle in outer space is the conclusion of 
"an international agreement" for disarmament at 
least for outer space [78-79]. 
But, while disarmament has not become an 
operative principle, at least through inter-
national agreement, the "obligation to strive for 
disarmament by the conclusion of an international 
agreement has special significance." [79 et seq .]. 
While Professor Tunkin--surely with all other 
responsible commentators and jurists--is intent 
upon the prohibition of war and the use of force 
or threat of force inconsistent with Article 2(4) 
of the United Nationsl Charter, he limits his goal 
to the prohibition of "aggressive" war, opening the 
possibility to the permissibility, and to the 
standards for establisHing the permissibility of 
those wars that are not "aggressive." (i.e., 
the wars of liberation, and the wars in which 
socialist states are engaged in defending them-
selves against nonsocialist states). But for 
jurists, his observations are limited to formulating 
and seeking the wide recognition of legal norms, 
even if they in themselves provide only limited 
restraint: 
Even though establishing a legal 
norm which prohibits war does not 
mean that war is eliminated, a 
real diverse influence of the 
norm upon the conduct of sub-
jects of international law is 
possible. The actual guarantees 
of the effectiveness of an inter-
national legal norm may be legal 
or nonlegal. [77-8]. 
Professor Tuniin's framework and analysis 
compels us to conclude that through the princi-
ples of consent and peaceful coexistence and 
the methodologies of Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet 
Union is afforded the legal basis and the policy 
guidelines to pursue its own objectives--in short, 
to achieve the goals that it associated with the 
inevitagle outcome of a Marxist-Leninist methodolo-
gy. Such an approach would turn the existing 
treaties and international agreements into tran-
sitional structures, wherever those agreements, or 
the law that is established under, and in 
accordance with such agreements, are inconsistent 
with Soviet goals assuming they are those pro-
claimed by Professor Tunkin. This of course does 
not mean that current agreements are not validated 
by the consent of the Soviet Union, but it does 
mean that they are subjected to the continuation 
of the consensual processes of that nation. It 
may mean--but this is a question to be addressed 
by Soviet colleagues in the effort to provide 
further clarification--that the present treaty 
structure will continue at least until the larger 
setting among states--the adoption by the prepon-
derance of states of socialism--has been attained. 
These are perspectives that when examined 
against those of the West leave the outcome in 
ambiguity, because the Soviet Union would be com-
pelled through its practice, and through future 
negotiations, and future treaties, to achieve the 
goals that Professor Tunkin sets forth. This 
would mean that the perspectives relating to the 
regulation of territorial air space by legal 
processes in the Soviet Union are expected to 
become the perspectives for regulating outer 
space. In particular, it means that the princi-
ples for assuring minimum order in outer space 
will be identified, at least by scholars who are 
adopting the views of Professor Tunkin, with the 
effective application first of the principle of 
peaceful coexistence. Ultimately, minimum order 
is assured only with the completion of the 
transition period when we will then perceive the 
disappearance of the capitalist state, the 
capitalist approach and the bourgeois methodolo-
gies and approaches to law that are inconsistent 
with these far-reaching structural changes. 
While these perspectives follow a pre-
ordained path, the "bourge~is methodology" of 
Professor McDougal sugges~ instead, that law 
and its authority and controlling effects will 
gradually develop and emerge with the widening 
participation of those involved in the law-
projecting processes. Professor McDougal 
emphasizing that we must displace doctrine, 
states: l7 
Sanctions presently available 
extend in authority and fact 
beyond mere "military coali-
tion" to the systematic use, 
by both international and 
national officials, of all 
base values by all methods--
diplomatic, economic, ideo-
logical, and military." The 
effects of this power process 
upon the distribution of values 
in the world can, finally, best 
be summarized in terms of 
"interdependence," an inter-
dependence of peoples from anti-
podes to antipodes for all values, 
an interdependence which makes any 
conception of "national interest," 
apart from the interest of most 
peoples of the world, the sheerest 
of illusions. 
It is not a matter purely of ver-
bal aesthetics what variables in 
this world power process are 
described as "law." One's use of 
a word of such critical significance 
may affect understanding and, hence, 
control. Thus, the critics of 
"law" who use the word to refer 
merely to authoritative rules or 
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formal doctrine, policy crys-
tallizations of the past, and 
who focus too sharply upon naked 
force as sanction may conceal 
from both themselves and others 
the true nature of the decision-
making process. It is not sug-
gested that past authoritative 
formulations of policy do not 
greatly influence decision-
makers. ,Such formulations 
play varying roles in the 
perspectives of different 
decision-makers to seek 
guidance from the experience 
of their predecessors. Decision-
making is also forward-looking, 
however, and decision-makers 
respond in fact not alone to 
prior prescriptions but to a 
great many environmental and 
predispositional variables, 
including doctrines which 
formulate the effects of alter-
native decisions upon the groups 
which they represent or with 
which they identify and which 
state objectives and policies for 
the future. The process of 
decision-making is indeed, as 
every lawyer knows, changing 
facts and claims. A conception 
of law which focuses upon doc-
trine to the exclusion of the 
pattern of practices by which 
it is given meaning and made 
effective, is, therefore, not the 
most conducive to understanding. 
It may be emphasized, further, 
that official decision-makers, 
the people who have formal 
authority and are expected to 
make important decisions, mayor 
may not make the decisions in fact. 
Effective control over decisions 
may be located in governmental 
institutions, but it may also be 
located in political parties or 
pressure groups or private associ-
ations and the people exercising 
control may rely for their power 
not upon formal authority but 
upon wealth, enlightenment, 
respect or other values. De-
scription which would concern it-
self with effects as well as with 
myth must take into account this 
structure of effective controls over 
apparent governors. Formal authority 
without effective control is illu-
sion; effective control without 
formal authority may be naked 
force. A realistic conception of 
law must, accordingly, conjoin 
formal authority and effective 
control and include not only 
doctrine but also the pattern of 
practices of both formal and 
effective decision-makers. A 
democratic conception of law may 
also include, to add brief detail, 
a commitment to change by peaceful 
procedures and to policies which 
prescribe a wide ~haring of 
power and other values, pro-
vision of procedures for the 
continual review and reformu-
lation of policies and 
representation in those 
procedures of all people who 
are affected, provision of 
procedures for the interpre-
tation and application of 
policies, and the balancing of 
effective power necessary to 
make procedures secure and to 
put policies into practice. 
Within the nation-state people 
do not rely alone upon the 
projection of doctrine to 
secure their values. They 
project doctrine in constitu-
tional and other forms, but 
they also seek to balance power--
within government, as between 
functions, legislative, executive, 
and judicial, and areally, from 
locality to state or province 
and region and nation; and 
between government and a host 
of nongovernmental organizations, 
parties, pressure groups, and 
pricate associations of all kinds. 
Today many, if not most, observers 
would agree that no combination 
of traditional international 
doctrine and "old-fashioned" 
diplomatic procedures could be 
adequate to secure a comparable 
balance in the world arena. The 
United Nations, the specialized 
agencies, and the regional 
organizations offer the begin-
nings of new commitments and of 
new procedures designed to secure 
such a balance and to organize 
effective community coercion 
behind the doctrines of freedom, 
peace, and abundance. Our 
actual choice is not between 
traditional international doctrine 
and old-fashioned diplomacy but 
between these new commitments 
and procedures and world anarchy 
and violence. It would seem 
most irrational, by a simple 
misidentification of "law," to 
reject the new because the old has 
failed. 
Jurists need no longer spend their efforts in 
reflecting on the intolerable destruction prom-
ised by the major nuclear weapons, or for that 
matter, by all of the major conventional weapons, 
and the weapons of mass destruction. These are 
among the givens or political realities that we 
are compelled to face. However, matters that now 
require their time are first the clarification of 
opposing views relating to how law is to be pro-
jected and made effective in the future, the 
extent to which law can be promoted through 
institutions and procedures and an operative legal 
process, and the extent to which lay may be made 
a shared strategy for common goals. 
All law is dependent for its development upon 
communications and communications supportive 
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activities. The communications process for 
effective law are those that assure timely, reli-
able, comprehensive and open communications. The 
communications that are critical for the shaping 
of effective law require the open dialectical 
process and balanced and responsible criticism 
that will give jurists, on a global basis, the 
prestige and influence that they must have with 
the decision and policy-makers they are to 
advise. 
Communications arenas in the largest sense 
are those involving the peoples of the world, 
because they are most likely to gain or lose 
through decisions relating to the security among 
nations. The challenges and threats among oppos-
ing social orders are most frequently made under 
hostile conditions, promoting secrecy, and denying 
the communications channels operative effective-
ness. 
Accordingly, as in the arms control agree-
ments in general, it is becoming increasingly 
evident that the law that can be projected in the 
future into outer space and in general will depend 
upon the major power blocs entering into com-
munications, devising more effective communica-
tion channels, offering more opportunity to their 
peoples to interact and communicate with each 
other, and using such communications to seek out 
common goals. This is not a recommendation that 
can be readily adopted, particularly when the 
past practice is examined. Yet even in the 
specific instances of extending the reach of the 
arms control agreements to qualitative changes in 
weaponry it has become increasingly evident that 
unless the communications-oriented "confidence 
building measures" [and "compliance" building 
measures] can be confidently installed, and 
effectively applied, there is little likelihood 
for real progress. But if they are installed, 
there is a strong likelihood for the development 
of law itself, and much that was discussed in 
this paper may find itself modified by the new 
and increasingly common perspectives shared 
among peoples everywhere. These will be perspec-
tives that genuinely seek the optimization of 
public dignity. 
The efforts of jurists, however, are designed 
to provide constraints and guidelines consistent 
with law--justification and rationalization of 
the conduct of states is recognized by all as 
the activity of the advocate who may too often 
freely dispose of his law as an instrument to 
serve his client. Accordingly, the fundamental 
question for jurists of our era is whether there 
is to be the common, shared attitudes toward law 
within a community among states, under shared con-
cepts of law, and aimed at common goals, or 
whether the law to be imposed is that law that is 
invoked in accordance with the strategies of a 
single state, imposed through the exercise of 
power, but justified in terms of special 
privilege and protections. 
All of our law--treaty law and customary 
international law--under the broadest rubric of 
"compliance"--must be law in which we share 
expectations as to effectiveness and enforcement. 
This is particularly true for the undertakings 
concerning the use of force and weapons, but it 
is also true for the larger strategic goals of 
a community that seeks to avoid nuclear 
destruction. It is caught in the observations of 
Professor Myres McDougal and his associates: 18 
The primary aim of a process of 
interpretation by an authorized 
and controlling community 
decision-maker can be formu-
lated in the following proposi-
tion: discover the shared 
expectations that the parties 
to the relevant communication 
[ the term "communication" 
being used in the largest sense 
of intercourse among states] 
succeeded in creating in each 
other. It would be an act of 
distortion on behalf of one party 
against another to ascertain and 
to give effect to his version of 
a supposed agreement if investi-
gation shows that the expecta-
tions of this party were not 
matched by the expectations of 
the other. And it would be an 
obvious travesty on interpreta-
tion for a community decision-
maker to disregard the shared 
subjectivities of the parties 
and to substitute arbitrary 
assumptions of his own. 
In a loose order among states in which 
those states are competing increasingly in situa-
tions in which their interests overlap and inter-
act, and compete, and are opposing, there are 
dangers enough that there may be a shift from the 
""interests" of states entitled to protection to 
interests identified exclusively with the poten-
tial "aggression" and "self-defense"--ambiguous 
notions symbolizing uses of force, and embracing 
ambiguous notions of regulation. 
ENDNOTES 
The purpose of these endnotes is to provide 
the sources of citations in the body of the paper, 
and to provide supplemental material that bears 
upon the arguments and reasons set forth in the 
paper. Neither the paper, nor this supplemental 
material, can adequately convey the full reach 
of the subject pursued, and it must be identified 
as a preliminary inquiry. Moreover, because com-
peting policies among governments, addressed by 
jurists, are necessarily matters of controversy, 
it is presupposed that the inquiry and the in-
quiries of others will proceed along the critical 
path that may lead to constructive outcomes. 
Western perspectives on Soviet law are col-
lected conveniently in Hans W. Baade, editor, 
THE SOVIET IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, Oceana 
Publications: Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1965. While 
numerous other commentaries have appeared since 
the publication of this book, most of the leading 
themes remain unchanged. The most striking oppo-
sition to the principle of peaceful coexistence 
among Western commentators is identified in the 
short essay of Professor Leon Lipson entitled 
"Peaceful Coexistence." (p. 27 et seq.). As to 
the claim of Professor Grigori Tunkin that the 
principle of peaceful coexistence lies "at the 
heart of international law," Professor Lipson 
concludes his analysis with the observation that 
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the Soviet Union insists "that the process of 
defining peaceful coexistence requires participa-
tion and consent of the Soviet Union; and, by 
implication, that any existing principle or norm 
of prior international law that has not been 
accepted by the Soviet Union as part of or consis-
tent with peaceful coexistence in general statement 
or in particular application has to be rejected as 
being for that reason invalid." , [at p. 36]. This 
perception appears to coincide with the arguments 
made by Professor Tunkin. 
Professor George Glnsburgs, addressing the 
perceptions of Soviet authorities on the "wars of 
national liberation" [ p. 66 et seq.] argues tha 
without effective legal conditions on such wars, 
without adequate sharing among states in the global 
community as to when and under what conditions 
such wars should be recognized, and without legal 
controls on such wars, they are combined with a 
"just war" theory that impairs the principles of 
nonaggression. A just" war approach, of course, 
automatically puts the government in power as an 
aggressor, a war-criminal, and within the "logic" 
of this perception not entitled to the protections 
of international law including the law of war. 
Perhaps a most significant difference in the 
approach of the Western scholar and that of 
Professor Tunkin lies in the perception of law 
itself. Professor Tunkin is concerned with the 
challenge to international law and the Western 
tradition that is being mounted by the Soviet Union 
through its ideological instruments of strategic 
policy. The existing law under these perceptions 
will be restructured and replaced. The Western 
commentator argues, conversely, that there is a 
basis, in the value demands among peoples, that 
must be fulfilled, and that this is the direction 
toward which the legitimatizing processes of an 
evolving, emerging law are directed. 
"Differences of ideologies have always 
existed," according to Professor Tunkin. "True 
this difference at present is profound. Bu~hen 
states agree on recognition of this or that norm as 
a norm of international law they do not agree on 
problems of ideology ..•. They do agree on rules of 
conduct." [From COEXISTENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
LAW, 95 Acad. de Droit Int., Recueil des Cours 
(1958), at pp. 58-611. 
While the perspectives of Professor Tunkin 
are conditioned and shaped by the Marxist-Leninist 
framework in which the outcome of the struggle 
between the capitalist and communist (or 
"socialist") systems is pre-ordained, and favors, 
exclusively, the communist perspectives, the 
perspectives of Professor McDougal are that states 
in the past and today are shaped within competi-
tive power processes, affected, however, by values 
in addition to power (e.g., respect, enlightenment, 
wealth, well-being (including safety, health, 
character, comfort), rectitude, skill and affec-
tion, and that these values are identified by 
peoples everywhere in terms of the gathering per-
spective of human dignity. Clearly, "the power 
process of any particular nation-state operates 
within the context of the world power process and 
both affects and is affected by the larger con-
text. " [At p. 969, in McDougal, et al., 
STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: New Haven and 
London: Yale Univ. Press, 1960]. While Professor 
Tunkin focuses very closely on power, 
Professor McDougal argues that law finds its 
sources inter alia through the value demands of 
the values just mentioned. The broadening reach 
of policy and law, of social order and legal order 
is then: 
In a world shrinking at an ever-
accelerating rate because of 
relentlessly expanding, uniformity-
imposing technology, both oppor-
tunity and need for the comparative 
study of law are unprecedented. 
In this contemporary world, people 
are increasingly demanding common 
values that transcend the 
boundaries of nation-states; 
they are increasingly inter-
dependent in fact, irrespective 
of nation-state boundaries, for 
cotrolling the conditions which 
affect the securing of their 
values; and they are becoming 
ever more realistic in their 
consciousness of such inter-
dependences, and hence widening 
their identifications to include 
in their demands more and more 
of their fellow men. [at pp. 
947-948). 
The differences between Professor McDougal 
and Professor Tunkin are, however, the subject 
of the paper itself. The shared, and mutual, 
strategy that we might identify with the shaping 
and emergence of international law, and with the 
nature of that law itself, is the outcome of the 
opposing claims and counterclaims among states. 
Under present conditions, the challenge and 
opposition are such that international law--to the 
extent it is shared between the West and the 
Soviet Union--is necessarily limited in its im-
pact. Perhaps the main thrust of inter-state 
concern has fallen back upon their security, and 
perhaps the perceptions of security demand--for 
each or most of them--more freedom to act and 
less restraint upon how they act. But that, for 
this inquiry, will remain a surmise. 
The distinctions of a major element in th 
policy approach of Professor McDougal--that 
relating to human rights--and the far lesser 
impact that human rights has upon Professor Tunkin 
can be found by comparing the massive treatment 
by Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and 
Lung-Chu Chen, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC 
ORDER. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press. 
1980, with Professor Tunkin's observations that 
introduce the settlement of the competitive power 
processes as a condition precedent to proceeding 
with human rights on the international plane, and 
the primary significance accorded such rights to 
the domestic plane: 
The further development of the 
international protection of 
human rights depends upon many 
circumstances, primarily upon 
improving the international situa-
tion, terminating the aggressive 
activities of imperialist powers, 
the arms race they have engendered, 
and the aggravation of international 
relations. 
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One proposition of cardinal 
importance should not be for-
gotten: securing human rights 
remains and will remain basically 
the domestic affair of states. 
Therefore, the principle field 
of struggle for human rights is 
the internal system of a state, 
and especially its socioeconomic 
system. [Grigori Tunkin, 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
Eng. Ed., p. 83). 
The pervasive theme of a "correlation of 
forces" a?pears in Professor Tunkin's text, and 
also in its political counterpart. For example, 
Communist Party Secretary Khrushchev declared thai 
through such a correlation of forces war could be 
prevented, i.e., 
People usually take only one 
aspect of the question; they con-
sider only the economic basis of 
wars under imperialism. This is 
not enough. War is not merely 
an economic phenomenon. Whether 
there is to be a war or not 
depends, in large measure, on 
the correlation of class, 
political forces, the degree of 
organization and the awareness 
and resolve of the people. 
[In CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES--
II, at p. 37, Frederick A. 
Praeger, New York, 1957). 
The question of public order raised in this 
paper requires analysis in greater depth. Public 
order, constituted among states, involves a 
process akin to the establishment of constitu-
tions. These within the Western democracies have 
led to the claims of sovereign rights in the 
peoples themselves, and through them the 
establishment of law that governs the public 
officials. The rights of the individuals--human 
rights--remain inviolate under all conditions. 
See generally, Charles H. McIlwain, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN, Cornell 
University Press: Ithaca, New York, 1947. 
Professor Tunkin carries the application 
of the principle of peaceful coexistence to the 
full implications in pointing up the development 
of the socialist law, applicable to socialist 
states, in a socialist commonwealth, and identi-
fied as a "higher law." This application was 
made as early as 1968 with respect to the 
Czechoslovakian crisis and rebellion (pages 
238, 438, 446): 
International law, just as 
national law, inheres in a 
class society. But class 
society, as has been proved 
by the basic tenets of 
Marxism, represents merely 
a certain stage in the 
development of human society, 
which also had existed where 
there were no classes •.•. 
Mankind is approaching a new 
organization of society which 
will not have law, and there-
fore, not international law. 
This, of course, does not mean 
that the society of the future 
will have no rules of conduct. 
A highly-organized human society 
as communist society will be, 
inevitably presupposes the 
existence of rules of conduct .•• 
The rules of conduct which will 
exist in communist society will 
by their nature be different 
from norms of law. The socialist 
principles of respect for state 
sovereignty, noninterference in 
internal affairs, and equality of 
states and peoples differ funda-
mentally from the corresponding 
principels of general international 
law; these socialist principles 
have another content: the rules 
of conduct themselves are changed 
partially as part of the content 
of the norms and, especially, the 
special aspect of the norm changes .•.• 
The social consequences of the 
operation of socialist international 
legal principles differ completely 
from the consequences of the opera-
tion of norms of general inter-
national law. The immediate 
reason for this is the qualitative 
distinctiveness of the special 
aspect of socialist principles from 
the principles of general inter-
national law and the difference in 
the social relations which are regu-
lated by socialist principles, on 
one hand, and by principles of 
general international law on the 
other. 
As a whole these are not general 
democratic principles but are 
completely different socialist 
international legal principles 
which relate to a new, higher 
type of international law--a 
socialist international law. 
they aim at strengthening and 
developing relations of the 
fraternal commonwealth of social-
ist countries, at ensuring the 
construction of socialism and 
communism, and at protecting the 
gains of socialism from the 
infringements of forces hostile 
to socialism. 
This, of course, suggests that the law and the 
legal order while operative is to be shaped to 
provide certain protections--not only from the 
nonsocialist states but from all "nonsocialist 
conduct" that arises from within. 
Professor Tunkin concludes this theme 
(at p. 446): 
The theoretical unfoundedness of 
the concept equating principles of 
relations between countries of the 
socialist camp with principles of 
general international law is that 
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it does not take into account the 
specific features of relations 
between countries of the socialist 
camp. But the specific feature 
exists, and it must, since the 
question is one of relations 
between states of a new historical 
type, of relations between states 
of a new historical type, of rela-
tions between socialist states. 
To assert that relations between 
socialist countries should be 
regulated only by principles of 
general international law is to 
deny the different class character 
of relations between the countries 
of socialism, to be derailed from 
party principle into the morass of 
bourgeois normativism. 
Accordingly, the conclusion is that general 
international law and the need for the operation 
of a principle of peaceful coexistence, along with 
the principle of consent, will vanish as the class 
struggle comes to an end, terminating through the 
rise of socialist states. Those states are not 
governed by international law as such but by 
socialist commonwealth law--a "higher law." More-
over, this outcome is dictated by historical 
materialism, -and the inevitability of social 
processes. In other parts of the text, not cited 
here, Professor Tunkin does indicate that the 
existing, general international law is in itself 
being modified by the infusion of the socialist 
principles bringing "new" law to bear. 
For a recent work on the interaction of 
domestic and international law by a Soviet writer 
see V.G. Butkevich, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, Kiev, 1981. 
According to Professor Hazard in 78 A.J.I.L. 
249-50 (1984) the author seeks to restructure the 
interaction of domestic and international law with 
emphasis on "dialectical unity"--which, according 
to Hazard, "will bring into municipal law the 
socialist features now being expanded in inter-
national bodies." These pressures will--peaceful-] 
ly--Iead to the transformation of the capitalist 
systems into communist systems. The text is 
described as a "closely reasoned program of action 
to spread socialist systems around the world," 
with intended impacts on influencing the "formula-
tion of international law." 
The political and action implications of the 
principles of peaceful coexistence are discussed 
at length by M.A. Suslov at the 20th Communist 
Party Congress. While peaceful measures were 
sought to transform global domestic orders into 
communism, and while the transformation was 
inevitable, the struggle must continue because 
"insofar as imperialism remains, the economic 
basis for the outbreak of wars also remains." 
While war can be deterred through the "balance of 
forces," the forms of transition from one social 
system to another "depend on the specific his-
torical conditions, and whether the methods are 
more peaceful or more violent depends not so much 
on the working class as on the extent and forms 
of resistance of the exploiting classes which are 
being overthrown and which do not wish to part 
voluntarily with the vast property, political 
power and other privileges they possess." [At 
pages 75, 76, CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES--II, 
DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF THE 20TH COMMUNIST PARTY 
CONGRESS. New York. Frederick Praeger. 1957. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
This inquiry has clarified the present 
realities of state behavior. Currently, states 
have failed to resolve their differences over when 
force or coercion may permissably be used, while 
the actual use of force and the regulation in favor 
of moderation has in practice been consistently 
abused. They have failed to adopt a shared basis 
for making such crucial decisions as these. They 
have, accordingly, adopted a shared strategy in 
which they continue, through a variety of 
strategies of their own, but always favoring 
military strategies, to assert claims and counter-
claims with regard to each--opposing each other 
in competitive processes. Normative or "juristic" 
proposals to resolve this stalemate are fruitless 
and become polemical and ideological strategies, 
pursued for exclusive or unilateral advantage. 
While these prescribe what jurists or diplomats 
might be seeking as law, they have not been 
adopted in the practice of states to project that 
law. A future inquiry might now, fruitfully, 
examine the possibilities, potentials and 
limitations on law and legal processes to promote 
the operative uses of law, adopted and shared 
while aimed at effectiveness among states--and 
aimed at a shared and secure order. Failing this, 
states, notwithstanding the claims for lawJwil1 
continue to face, as in the past, the uncertain-
ties of hostile relations and the tensions 
those hostilities create. Communications limited 
to the military arena are notably the communica-
tions of threat, confrontation and power. 
